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Complex networks are the subject of fundamental interest from the scientific com-
munity at large. Several metrics have been introduced to characterize the structure
of these networks, such as the degree distribution, degree correlation, path length,
clustering coefficient, centrality measures etc. Another important feature is the
presence of network symmetries. In particular, the effect of these symmetries has
been studied in the context of network synchronization, where they have been used
to predict the emergence and stability of cluster synchronous states. Here we pro-
vide theoretical, numerical, and experimental evidence that network symmetries
play a role in a substantially broader class of dynamical models on networks, in-
cluding epidemics, game theory, communication, and coupled excitable systems.
Namely, we see that in all these models, nodes that are related by a symmetry re-
lation show the same time-averaged dynamical properties. This discovery leads
us to propose reduction techniques for exact, yet minimal, simulation of complex
networks dynamics, which we show are effective in order to optimize the use of
computational resources, such as computation time and memory.
PACS numbers: 05.45.a
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There has been substantial research into the role of the network symmetries in af-
fecting cluster synchronization. This paper discusses the effects of the network sym-
metries on other types of network dynamics, including evolutionary games, traffic
models, and neuronal dynamical models.
I. OUTLINE
In recent years a large body of research has investigated the dynamics of complex net-
works, including percolation1, epidemics2,3, synchronization4–13, evolutionary games14,15,
neuronal models16,17, and traffic dynamics18–26. These studies are relevant to better model,
understand, design, and control networks in technological, biological, and social applica-
tions. Extensive research has shown that the topology of these networks (e.g. their degree
distribution27,28, degree correlation29,30, community structure31, etc.) plays a significant
role in their dynamical time evolution32.
Another important feature of the network topology is the presence of network symme-
tries, which so far have remained to some extent unexplored, with some exceptions13,36–39.
These symmetries have been shown to be commonplace in many real networks40, hence
it becomes important to understand how they can affect the dynamics of the network.
References13,36–39 have focused on the role played by the network symmetries on the
emergence of cluster synchronization. Here we consider several well known dynamical
models on networks and try to illustrate the effects of the underlying network symmetries
on the network dynamics. Our study indicates that network symmetries play a role in
all the dynamical models considered and in particular: evolutionary games14,15, network
traffic18–26, and propagation of excitation among excitable systems41–43; and thus suggests
the effects of the symmetries on the dynamics may be a rather general feature of complex
networks. However, as we will see, the particular effect of the symmetries varies based on
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Figure 1. Effects of the network symmetries in three different dynamical models/networks:
(a) the Zachary’s Karate Club network33, (b) the Bellsouth network34 and (c) a random graph,
nodes colored the same are in the same symmetry cluster except the gray colored nodes, each of
which is in a cluster by itself. (d-f) Prisoner’s Dilemma game played, (g-i) Network traffic model
simulated and (j-l) dynamics of the Kinouchi Copelli model35 in these networks (a-c).
the particular type of dynamics considered.
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Here, the topology of a network is described by the adjacency matrix A= {Ai j}, where
Ai j = A ji is equal to 1 if node j and i affect each other and is equal to 0 otherwise. We
define a network symmetry as a permutation of the network nodes that leaves the network
structure unaltered. The symmetries of the network form a (mathematical) group G . Each
element of the group can be described by a permutation matrix Π that re-orders the nodes
in a way that leaves the network structure unchanged (that is, each Π commutes with A,
ΠA = AΠ). Though the set of symmetries (or automorphisms) of a network can be quite
large, even for small networks, it can be computed from knowledge of the matrix A by
using widely available discrete algebra routines. In fact, except for simple cases for which
it may be possible to identify the symmetries by inspection, in general for an arbitrary
network, the use of a software is required. In this study we used Sage44, an open-source
mathematical software. Once the symmetries are identified, the nodes of the network can
be partitioned into M clusters by finding the orbits of the symmetry group, i.e., the disjoint
sets of nodes that, when all of the symmetry operations are applied, permute among one
another in the same set.
II. SYMMETRIES OF THE NETWORK DYNAMICS
Figure 1(a), (b), and (c) shows three examples of undirected networks: the Zachary’s
Karate Club network33 of N = 34 nodes, the Bell South network45 of N = 51 nodes and
a randomly generated Erdös-Rényi (ER) graph of N = 20 nodes, respectively. Each node
of the Karate Club network is a member of a university karate club and a connection rep-
resents a friendship relation between the members. The nodes of the Bell South network
are the IP/MPLSs (Multiprotocol Label Switching: a switching mechanism used in high-
performance telecommunications networks) backbone and connections represent routing
paths. In Fig. 1(a), (b) and (c) colors of the nodes indicate the clusters they belong to,
either non-trivial (i.e. clusters with more than one node in them) or trivial clusters (clus-
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ters with only one node in them). All the nodes in trivial clusters are colored gray, while
the non-trivial clusters are colored differently. The Karate Club network in Fig. 1(a) has
C = 4 nontrivial clusters, 23 trivial clusters and 480 symmetries. The Bell South network
in Fig. 1(b) displays C = 9 nontrivial clusters, 24 trivial clusters and 29,859,840 symme-
tries. The random network in Fig. 1(c) has C = 6 non-trivial clusters, 8 trivial clusters and
8 symmetries. The rest of Fig. 1 has a total of nine panels, one for each of three networks
and each of three dynamical models. The three dynamical models are: evolutionary game
theory (d-f), network traffic (g-i), and propagation of excitation among excitable system
(j-l).
We now briefly introduce the models, which are all stochastic in nature. The evolution-
ary game theory dynamics models the evolution of cooperation and defection in a popula-
tion of coupled agents (nodes), playing the Prisoner’s Dilemma game. At each time step
a node is randomly selected and its strategy is updated. The new strategy to be adopted
is probabilistically determined based on the payoffs of the nodes surrounding the selected
node and their strategy selection.
Each one of the network nodes (agents) iteratively plays a version of the Prisoner’s
Dilemma game14. Each node i can either be a cooperator (Si = 1) or a defector (Si = 0).
The network connectivity is defined by the adjacency matrix A, described earlier. We
define a payoff between two players, based on the well known Prisoner’s Dilemma game.
There are two types of strategy adopted by the players: cooperation and defection. A
cooperator pays a cost c for each one of the agents it is connected to and a defector pays
nothing14. Each node receives a benefit equal to b for each cooperator it is connected to.
When playing the game, node i receives a payoff equal to
ξi =∑
j
(Ai jbS j−A jicSi). (1)
We define the fitness14 of each node to be fi = 1−ω+ωξi, where 0≤ω ≤ 1 measures
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the intensity of selection: ω ' 1 means strong selection, that is the fitness is almost equal
to the payoff and ω ' 0 means weak selection, that is the fitness is almost independent
of the payoff and close to 1. The literature14,46–48 focuses on the case of weak selection,
which is also what we consider here (in all our simulations we either set ω = 0.1 or ω =
0.2). Following14 we choose a ‘Death-birth’ (DB) updating rule for the game evolution.
Namely, in each time step a randomly selected node i is replaced by a new offspring (node).
The new offspring evolves into either a cooperator or a defector depending on the fitness
of the surrounding agents. We set the probability of that new node to be a cooperator to
be σ(FCi−FDi), where FCi and FDi are the fitnesses of cooperators and defectors in the
neighboring nodes and σ is a monotonically increasing function such that 0≤ σ ≤ 1. This
reflects a higher propensity of turning into a cooperator based on how well the neighbors
of a given node that are cooperators are doing with respect to the other neighbors of that
node that are defectors. The total fitness of the neighbors of player i is equal to
Fi =
N
∑
j
Ai j f j (2)
The total fitness of the cooperators, FCi and defectors, FDi in the neighboring nodes of i is
defined as,
FCi =
N
∑
j
Ai jS j f j =∑
j
Ai jS j(1−ω)+ω∑
j
Ai jS jξ j
FDi =Fi−FCi =
N
∑
j
Ai j(1−S j)(1−ω)+ω∑
j
Ai j(1−S j)ξ j
(3)
Letting xi = (FCi−FDi), we write the probability that the new offspring will be a coop-
erator σ(xi). Here we set σ(xi) = γxi+ε , where γ > 0 and ε are two arbitrary constants. In
all our numerical simulations the values of γ and ε were chosen so as to ensure 0≤ σ ≤ 1
for all i’s. In Sec. S1 of the Supplementary Information we obtain a set of equations that
describe the time evolution of the game and prove its equivariance with respect to permu-
tations of the network nodes that are in the automorphism group of A.
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We numerically iterated the game on several networks, including the three shown in
Figs. 1 (a), (b) and (c) for a number of time-steps and for each node i we monitored
〈Si〉 the fraction of times a node spends in the cooperator state. For each run, the game
was iterated until a state was reached in which the number of cooperators and defectors
stabilized. Figures 1(d), (e) and (f) show 〈S〉i, the fraction of times that each node spends
in the cooperator state for each one of the nodes of the networks in Fig. 1(a), (b) and (c),
respectively.
In the network traffic model, packets are originated at source nodes, get routed through
a sequence of intermediate nodes, until they reach the destination nodes and get removed
from the network18–26. At every intermediate node, packets are placed at the bottom of
that node’s queue. When they reach the top of the queue they get routed to one of the
neighboring nodes. Here we consider a simple routing strategy that attempts to avoid nodes
with large queues assigning them a lower probability of being selected for routing. Figure
1(g), (h), and (i) show the rate of growth of the queue length (number of packets in the
queue) at each node for the three networks shown in Figure 1(a), (b), and (c), respectively.
Finally, we consider a network of coupled excitable systems41. Each one of these
systems can be in either one of three states: quiescent, excited, and refractory. Nodes
that are excited can excite neighboring nodes that are in the quiescent state with a certain
probability. Figure 1(j), (k), and (l) show the frequency of excitation at each node for
the three networks shown in Figure 1(a), (b), and (c), respectively. A more precise and
detailed description of the evolutionary game theory model is provided in Supplementary
Information Sec. S1, of the network traffic model in Supplementary Information Sec. S2,
and of the excitable systems model in Supplementary Information Sec. S3.
Our main result is that for all the three networks and the three dynamical models, nodes
that belong to the same cluster show the same time-averaged dynamics. This is illustrated
in detail in Fig. 1 (d)-(l). While this observation holds irrespective of the particular network
and type of dynamics, the particular time-averaged value attained by the nodes in the same
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cluster is network and model specific. Note that in the figure nodes are ordered by their
degree (which is the label on the abscissa-axis). For example, for the game theory model,
we observe that the nodes in the same cluster approximately show the same frequency of
being a cooperator (or defector) but that does not necessarily correlate with the degree.
Here we see that the symmetries in the network topology can predict dynamics better than
the nodes’ degrees.
For each one of the dynamical models considered, we have performed an analysis to: (i)
predict the emergence of clusters when the dynamics is averaged in time and (ii) predict
the values attained by the nodes in each cluster. The results of this analysis is reported
for the evolutionary game, communication model and the excitable systems model in the
Supplementary Information, Secs. S1, S2, and S3.
III. QUOTIENT GRAPH REDUCTION
As mentioned in the introduction, symmetries are common features of biological net-
works, technological networks, social networks etc. MacArthur et al.49 have analyzed
datasets of large complex networks and have found that these present large numbers of
symmetries, see Supplementary Information Sec. S4. Intensive research in social sciences,
biology, engineering, and physics uses numerical simulations of large complex networks
to understand and predict their dynamical behavior (e.g., in a given network, the critical
value of the infection rate above which an epidemics occurs), in order to better characterize
and control real-world phenomena.
Our results in Secs. II, S1, S2, and S3 point out that nodes that are related by a symmetry
operation display the same time-averaged dynamical behavior. This immediately raises the
question whether a reduction of the dynamics is possible in which duplicate nodes can be
omitted, leading to minimal models of complex networks, and so to a better exploitation of
computational resources in numerical simulations, such as computation time and memory.
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Related questions have been asked in the literature of complex networks, where nodes have
been grouped according to some of their features, most notably the degree27 and these
approaches have been successful at predicting and explaining several network properties,
in particular in the case of scale free networks28. While these approaches are typically
based on mean-field models and thus approximate, here our grouping of nodes is based on
the exact concept of a symmetry.
Our ultimate goal is to generate minimal network models that reproduce certain features
of the dynamics by using the least possible number of nodes. In the case of synchroniza-
tion dynamics, we know that a quotient network reduction is possible, in which the exact
cluster-synchronous time-evolution is generated by a minimal number of nodes (i.e., one
node for each cluster). However, how to obtain minimal network models for other types
of dynamics, remains an open question. To address this issue, here we will briefly review
the concept of a quotient network.
Under the action of the symmetry group, the set of the network nodes is partitioned into
C disjoint structural equivalence classes called the group orbits, O1,O2, ...,OC, such that
C⋃
`=1
|O`G |= N and O iG ∩O jG = 0, where i, j = 1,2, ...,C, j 6= i.
Then we can define a C×C matrix Aˆ corresponding to the quotient network such that
for each pair of sets (Ov,Ou),
Aˆuv = ∑
j∈Ov
Ai j, (4)
for any i ∈ Ou (i.e., independent of i ∈ Ou), and for u,v= 1,2, ...,C.
In Fig. 2(a) we show a randomly generated network of 10 nodes and in Fig. 2(b) its
quotient graph reduction. We see that all the nodes in the same cluster (these are colored
the same in the figure on the left), map to only one node of the quotient network (on the
right) and the color identifies the reduced node. Note that the quotient network may be
directed even if the original full network is undirected. It is also possible that nodes of
the quotient network form self connections, which represent connections between nodes
9
Figure 2. (a) A 10 node network and (b) its 5 node quotient reduction. Inset of (a) shows one
arduino board with radio transmitter, which we used in our experiments. Plots (c) and (d) are
experimental time traces showing the running average for the fraction of times each node spends in
the cooperator state for the full network in (a) and the quotient network in (b), respectively. Colors
in (c) and (d) are consistent with (a) and (b).
belonging to the same cluster in the original graph.
In general, the mathematical equations we have derived in Sec. II and S1, S2, S3 of Sup-
plementary Information for all the three models can be projected onto the corresponding
quotient network equations (see the Supplementary Information Sec. S4 for an example).
However, obtaining an equivalent model that can be simulated on the quotient network
and reproduce the original full network dynamics may require a particular adaptation of
the model, which is model specific.
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We show that the quotient graph can be conveniently exploited in simulations involving
large networks to reduce computation time and memory. These simulations may be used to
model various type of dynamics, including epidemics, congestion, emergence of coopera-
tion, as discussed in Sec. II, just to mention a few examples. In order to demonstrate this
point we consider the evolutionary game theory model presented in Sec. II and for a num-
ber of networks, we study how well the corresponding quotient graphs can approximate
the evolutionary dynamics of the original full network. In what follows we describe evolu-
tion of the Prisoner’s Dilemma dynamics, as described in Sec. II, on the quotient network.
We indicate with Sˆ j = {0,1} the strategy of node j of the quotient network, where 0 rep-
resents defection and 1 represents cooperation. At each iteration of the game, the payoff
received by quotient node i from its neighboring nodes is equal to ξˆi = ∑ j Aˆi j
(
bSˆ j− cSˆi
)
.
Note that this expression for the payoff differs from that for the full network in Eq. (1) as
the mapping of nodes from the full network to the quotient network preserves the indegree
of the nodes, but not the outdegree. Moreover, the fitness of quotient node i is equal to
fˆi = 1−ω+ωξˆi. Similarly we write the expressions,
Fˆi =∑
j
Aˆi j fˆ j
FˆCi =∑
j
Aˆi jSˆ j(1−ω)+ω∑
j
Aˆi jSˆ jξˆ j
FˆDi =∑
j
Aˆi j(1− Sˆ j)(1−ω)+ω∑
j
Aˆi j(1− Sˆ j)ξˆ j
(5)
where Fˆi, FˆCi and FˆDi are the total fitness, the fitness of the neighboring cooperators, and the
fitness of the neighboring defectors of a quotient node i, respectively. We set the same cost
c and benefit b as for the full network. At each time step, a node of the quotient network
is selected with probability proportional to the cardinality of its orbit set and replaced by
a new offspring. This new node becomes a cooperator with a probability σ
(
FˆCi− FˆDi
)
,
where σ is the function defined in Sec. 2.
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We expect that the time averages
〈
ξ f
〉 ≈ 〈ξˆq〉, 〈FC f 〉 ≈ 〈FˆCq〉 and 〈FDf 〉 ≈ 〈FˆDq〉,
where node f of the full network maps to node q of the quotient network (for nodes
of the full network that are in the same cluster, we know that the time averages are the
same from the analysis in Sec. II). Moreover, the time-averaged strategy for a node of
the quotient network
〈
Sˆq
〉
is the same as the time-averaged strategy for the corresponding
node of the full network,
〈
S f
〉
. Figure III compares the simulation results for the Bellsouth
network (squares) and its quotient reduction (diamonds). As can be seen, we find very
good agreement between the full and quotient network time-averaged dynamics. This
indicates that, if we are interested in the time-averaged behavior, we can equivalently
perform a simulation on the full network or on the reduced quotient network.
In order to test the robustness of our results in a real setting, we have built an experimen-
tal network of coupled agents iteratively playing the Prisoner’s Dilemma. This network
is composed of 10 wirelessly coupled transceiver modules (details in Supplementary Sec.
S7) as shown in Fig. 2a using nRF24L01 2.4 GHz RF transceivers on Arduino boards.
The transceiver modules act as the nodes of the network. All the transceiver modules have
unique addresses, i.e., communication is one to one. To construct this network, communi-
cation links of each module are restricted as per the topology of the network, i.e., only the
connected modules can communicate and share information with each other. For exam-
ple, radio module 7 in Fig. 2a can only communicate with modules 4, 6, 8, and 10. This
experimental realization is subject to practical limitations that are hard to reproduce in
simulation. In particular, in our experimental setting these limitations are mainly imposed
by the reliability of the radio communication between the individual units (details in the
Supplementary Information Sec. S7). We have also built an experimental version of the
quotient network in Fig. 2b. The experimental time traces for the networks in Fig. 2 a and
b when the game is played are shown in Fig. 2c and d, respectively. We see that: i) nodes
of the full network that are in the same cluster attain the same frequency of cooperation
12
Figure 3. Comparison between simulation results of the evolutionary game on the Bellsouth net-
work in Fig. 1(b) and its quotient version. The diamond marks correspond to simulation on the full
network and the square marks correspond to the simulation on the quotient network. Points that
are colored the same correspond to nodes in the same cluster (coloring is consistent with Fig. 1(a)
and (b), except for the gray colored nodes, each of which is in a cluster by itself).
as the game is iterated and ii) for large time the quotient network well predicts the full
network experimental dynamics.
Since the quotient graphs have in general fewer nodes than the full graphs, they can
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be advantageous in terms of both memory and time needed in simulation. The size of
the adjacency matrix reduces from N×N to C×C and the number of nonzero elements
of the matrix decreases from NKav to roughly
√
NCKav, where Kav is the average node
degree of the full network. We define the reduction coefficient ρg =C/N. A smaller value
of the ratio ρg indicates higher reduction of the number of nodes in the quotient graph
with respect to the original graph. Note that a critical aspect of simulation of large real
networks is the limitation of software memory allocation. We computed the CPU time
required by a single iteration of the prisoner’s dilemma dynamics for several networks and
their quotients. Fig. 4(a) and Table S2 in the Supplementary Information show the CPU
time ratio ρt = tq/t f , where t f and tq are the CPU time for an iteration of full and quotient
network, respectively.
For both the full network and the quotient network we also computed the simulation
convergence time, which we measured as follows. We randomly picked an initial condition
for each node of the quotient network and assigned the same initial condition to all the
nodes in the corresponding cluster of the full network. At each time step, we computed
the running average for the fraction of times a node spent in the cooperation state. For each
node we measured its individual convergence time, i.e., the time after which the running
average remained steadily in a [−δ ,+δ ] interval of the final state. The convergence time
of the network was taken to be the largest of the convergence times of the nodes. Fig. 4(b)
and Table S2 in the Supplementary Information show the convergence time ratio ρc =
τq/τ f , where τ f and τq are the convergence times for the full and the quotient network,
respectively.
We note that simulating the dynamics on the quotient graph, rather than on the original
network, can reduce the computational effort, while producing approximately the same
time-averaged dynamics. In Fig. 4(c) and Table S2 in the Supplementary Information
we show the accuracy parameter ∆, defined as the normalized average difference of the
14
Figure 4. (a) CPU time ratio (b) Convergence time ratio (c) Error between the full and quotient
network time-averaged dynamics.
time-averaged frequency of cooperation between the full and the quotient networks,
∆=
1
N
N
∑
i
|〈S〉i− ˆ〈S〉i|
Si
, (6)
where 〈S〉i and ˆ〈S〉i are the time-averaged frequency of cooperation of node i and its cor-
responding node in the quotient network, respectively.
Figure 4 shows that as the reduction coefficient is lowered, the CPU time ratio ρt and the
convergence time ratio ρc decrease in a linear fashion but the normalized error parameter
∆ is roughly independent of ρg. It is important to look at the y-axes of the plots in Figs.
4(a), (b) and (c). For example, for a strong reduction coefficient ρg ' 0.2, corresponding
to the Media Owners Group network, the CPU time is lowered by roughly 95% but the
normalized error ∆ only increases by approximately 2%.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
By applying a symmetry analysis to a network, we have uncovered clusters of nodes
that are structurally and functionally equivalent. This becomes apparent when monitoring
the time-averaged state of the nodes in a variety of network models (previous work had
15
only focused on the particular case of synchronization dynamics) and is confirmed in an
experimental realization of an evolutionary game played on a network, in the presence of
noise and communication losses. Thus it appears that the emergence of symmetry clusters
in the time-averaged dynamics of networks is a quite general feature. For the case of the
evolutionary game, we obtain a reduction technique for exact, yet minimal, simulation of
complex networks dynamics, which produces similar dynamical results, while computa-
tion requires less time and memory. However, a generalization of this quotient network
reduction to other types of dynamics is nontrivial. The reason is that each dynamical model
involves a different set of rules, which may be difficult to convert into equivalent rules for
the quotient network. We hope our work will stimulate further research into reduction
techniques that can be applied in a variety of dynamical models.
Supplementary Material Supplementary Material for this paper includes 7 sections.
The evolutionary game theory model, network traffic model, and biological excitable sys-
tem model are described in Sections S1, S2, and S3, respectively. The equations describing
the quotient network dynamics are presented in Section S4. Tables for the symmetries of
real networks and the computational aspects of the quotient network simulations are in-
cluded in Sections S5 and S6, respectively. The experimental realization is described in
Section S7.
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